In this paper, we address the role of countries' goods trade networks for their services trade volume. The paper employs a large cross-section of bilateral trade data on aggregate cross-border goods and services sales and illustrates that the depth and overlap of two countries' services networks induce a positive direct impact on their services trade volume. The evidence takes into account that goods trade flows and networks are potentially endogenous so that the estimated direct effects support a causal interpretation. We find that the magnitude of the multilateral goods-trade network effect on the bilateral services-trade volume is much larger than that of bilateral goods-trade volume.
Introduction
It is now widely agreed that a substantial part of the explanation for the extraordinary growth in trade from the 1980s forward is the application of increasingly refined strategies of global organization of production involving trade in intermediates, outsourcing, foreign direct investment, et cetera in virtually endless combinations (e.g., Baldwin, 2006 Baldwin, , 2014 Yi, 2003) .
1 It has been widely noted that such global sourcing strategies involve complex patterns of flows of (primarily intermediate) goods
passing into international trade many times, in many combinations, before reaching final consumers (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2014; Johnson and Noguera, 2012a, b; Francois, Manchin, and Tomberger 2013) . While the role of intermediate goods has been studied in this context, less commonly commented on, and even less systematically studied, is the role of services in supporting this trade (though see Low, 2013 , for an exception). In this paper, we focus directly on trade in services and its relationship to trade in goods, emphasizing the role of services trade in supporting complexity in goods trade.
In fact, there is a literature on the economics of trade services in the context of standard trade models (Deardorff, 1985 (Deardorff, , 2001 Markusen, 1989; Melvin, 1989; Francois, 1990b; ; van Marrewijk, Stibora, de Vaal, and Viaene, 1997; Lennon, Mirza, and Nicoletti, 2009) . That is, these are services supporting trade (i.e., transportation, insurance, etc.), not services supporting a broader division of labor of the sort considered in the unbundling of production. 2 The latter is our particular focus. It is 1 The same fact was, not surprisingly, a major part of the dramatic collapse of trade during the recent financial crisis Yi, 2009, 2011; Ferrantino and Taglioni, 2014; Milberg and Winkler, 2010) .
2 An exception in this regard is the work of Francois (1990a, c) who is specifically interested in interesting to note, in this context, that the rapid increase in trade associated with global sourcing does not seem to correlate with either a corresponding fall in formal protection (Yi, 2003) or transportation cost (Hummels, 2007) . Instead, what Baldwin (2006 Baldwin ( , 2014 calls the second unbundling is more associated with widespread adoption of infomatic technology. By permitting the adoption of global sourcing, the associated fall in the overall coordination costs of managing a global production structure will increase demand not only for infomatic services, but for trade services supporting physical flows of intermediates, like transportation, insurance, finance, et cetera over the geographic domain of that global sourcing.
As Baldwin (2011) notes, the firm-level properties of the second unbundling have implications for the geographic distribution of economic activity. Specifically, while the information costs of managing a global production structure may not rise with distance (at least at the rate that the other trade costs do), distance might well proxy for generalized uncertainty and, perhaps more to the point, the costs of managerial attention (e.g., the costs to managers of traveling to facilities abroad) may rise quite dramatically with distance. All of this suggests that, ceteris paribus, there may be a strongly regional cast to this sort of specialization. Of course, cetera are not generally paribus. There may well be labor markets with wages (conditional on productivity) sufficiently low to make contracting for part of the production process worth the coordination cost. For our purposes, the essential thing is that similar firms will want to engage in similar global sourcing strategies.
3 To the extent that, services permitting a broader and more complex production structure. For a broad overview of the literature on trade in services, see Francois and Hoekman (2010) .
as argued above, a sizable share of trade growth was growth in global sourcing, post second unbundling, we would expect to see the emergence of patterns of trade reflecting common global sourcing strategies. In network terms, that means that we should see countries with firms pursuing common global sourcing strategies revealing substantial trade overlap -that is, they would have overlapping trade networks.
This has interesting implications for service trade. Much of the earlier literature on service trade suggests that trade services have a substantial degree of specificity.
In the simple case, they are specific to a transaction (e.g., a haircut requires proximity to a head), but more generally they are often specific to a given market (e.g., local legal services, local knowledge, etc. Ours is far from the first paper to study service trade in the context of an econometric gravity model. Much of this work is primarily interested in the question of whether the same variables explain trade in services that explain trade in goods.
Applied to trade in goods, the gravity model is so successful that it is reasonable to characterize it as the industry standard empirical framework for the analysis of international trade. With the development of coherent micro foundations in general equilibrium theory, considerable clarity has been gained in terms of appropriate specification and interpretation of the results of gravity models (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch, 2013) . 4 Among standard findings from this research are that trade robustly declines with distance (Disdier and Head, 2008) , borders reduce trade (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2001; Anderson and Yotov, 2010) , and preferential trade agreements increase trade (Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010) . While the empirical literature on trade in services has developed more recently, improved data on that trade has led to quite rapid growth in such research. Proceeding from research which presumes that economic delivery of services is fundamentally different from that for goods, most of this research has simply asked whether the same factors explain trade in services as trade in goods (e.g., Ceglowski, 2006; Kimura and Lee, 2006; Walsh, 2008; Head, Mayer, and Rieds, 2009; Christen and Francois 2010; Egger, Larch, and Staub, 2012; Kandilov and Grennes, 2012; Guillin, 2013; van der Marel and Shepherd, 2013; Anderson, Milot, and Yotov, 2014) . Most of these find that standard gravity variables that the same effects as to sign (i.e., distance and borders reduce trade, PTAs increase it). 5 Of particular relevance for our work, a number of papers have found complementarity between trade in goods and trade in services (Ceglowski, 2006; Kimura and Lee, 2006) and between foreign direct investment and trade in services (Grünfeld and Moxnes, 2003; Fillat Castejon, Francois, and Woerz, 2008) . The specifications in these papers are based on the trade services notion that 4 For up to date surveys of theoretical and empirical issues, see: Anderson (2011); Bergstrand and Egger (2011); Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2014); and Head and Mayer (2014) .
5 As with many bodies of research, there is not unanimity on any of these results. Thus, for example, Kandilov and Grennes (2012) do not find a significant effect of distance; Grünfeld and Moxnes (2003) do not find an effect of PTAs.
services (like transportation and insurance) are tied to trade (or FDI) in a direct way. Thus, trade is directly included as a variable in the service trade gravity model.
As explained above, we are interested in the idea that, in addition to trade services, business services supported by infomatics support the second unbundling. Thus, based on the above discussion, we use a measure of good trade network overlap as a proxy for common networks that would demand common services broadly construed.
Our research question is motivated, in part, by recent research on social networks (Kolaczyk, 2009; Newman, 2010; Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . The tools, and conceptual structures, developed by network researchers provide a very useful approach to understanding and characterizing structures of social interaction. These have already proved useful in research on international trade (See Rauch 2001 for a convenient survey). While much research by economists focuses on networks as an emergent property created by agent behavior or as a constraint on individual behavior (e.g. Jackson, 2008; Goyal, 2009; Easley and Kleinberg, 2010) , in this paper, we are more interested in trade network structures (strictly network homophily) as an indicator of a need for common network coordination issues that require common service inputs.
In what follows, we outline an empirical gravity model of services trade which is fit to being used for estimating the role of goods trade networks for services trade volume in the subsequent section. Section 3 describes the sources and characteristics of data this model is informed with. Section 4 summarizes the key findings from the empirical analysis, and the last section concludes with a brief summary and outline for future research.
A gravity model of services trade
A generic model of bilateral trade for any sector and year (suppressing the sector and year indices) may be written as
where X ij measures the volume of exports of country i to country j (or imports of j from i), τ ij is a trade-cost function that we will specify below, µ i and m j are exporter-and importer-specific effects related to supply and demand potential, and u ij ) is a disturbance (or stochastic) term. Since everything in the parentheses on the right-hand side of (3) comes under the exponential expression, the respective elements {τ ij , µ i , m j , u ij } are measured in logs. Leading examples in the literature (see Bergstrand, 1985 Bergstrand, , 1989 Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) specify the trade-cost function in a log-additive way, we may write
where t k,ij is the kth trade-cost factor (e.g., log bilateral distance but also binary indicator variables measuring land adjacency, common language, common history, etc.) and α k is the parameter on it (a partial elasticity for variables in logs and a partial semi-elasticity for binary variables). We admit that µ i and m j have a structural interpretation and are nonlinear functions of τ ij (see Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Fally, 2015) . However, the latter is of minor importance here, since we condition on them through fixed effects (as, e.g., in Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann, 2011; or Fally, 2015) .
What is of primary interest here are estimates of τ ij and, hence, α k , in particular, to the extent that they relate to bilateral goods trade volume and bilateral goods trade network overlap with X ij measuring the bilateral volume of services trade. 
Specification of the trade-cost function and data sources
We propose a trade-cost function which includes four classes of components: ones relating to goods trade volume and networks; ones relating to geography; ones relating to common culture and history; and ones relating to politics. Moreover, since we consider goods trade volume and network factors as endogenous determinants of services trade, we consider goods-tariff measures as instruments in a just-identified approach (where the number of identifying instruments corresponds to the number of endogenous right-hand-side variables).
Goods trade volume and network factors: We utilize two types of variables which relate to goods trade which we measure in 2011 based on information from the United Nations' Comtrade database. One is the volume of goods trade between countries i and j. This we measure as the log of the total bilateral goods trade volume, x Common cultural and historical factors: We employ measures on ethnological language communality, lang ij , as well as on prior colonial relationships -one measuring whether i was a colony of j or vice versa, colony ij , and one measuring whether i and j have had a common colonizer in the past, colonizer ij .
Political factors:
We include one measure which captures the difference in polit-ical freedom and the functioning of the political systems of two countries i and j.
Specifically, we use the absolute difference in the Polity IV index scaled by the sum of two countries' individual index values as published by Marshall (2014) , dpolity ij .
Instruments:
We use log applied (one-plus) simply-averaged goods-tariff rates between pairs of countries (on imports of i from j and vice versa) as a variable that exclusively affects bilateral goods-trade volume. The corresponding data come from the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.
Descriptive statistics
In order to describe the variation in the data, we report the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) and the normalized maximum spread (maximum minus minimum over the mean). We do so in 
Implementation of the stochastic model
The implementation works in two steps. In the first step, we run a model for goods trade akin to the one in equation (3) 
In the second step, we estimate
for services trade volume by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood, which corresponds to (3) except for the inclusion of c ij which guards against the endogeneity bias of the parameters on the goods-trade-volume and goods-network-overlap variables in the services-trade-volume regression (see Wooldridge, 2010) . 
Empirical results
The empirical results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 . While we assume that net G ij and x G ij are exogenous in Table 2 , we treat them as endogenous right-hand-side variables as outlined in Section 3.4 in Table 3 . Each of the two tables reports parameter estimates and -underneath them -heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors at the top and some information about the sample size and the explanatory power of the models at the bottom. Moreover, each table is organized in two horizontal blocks:
two columns on the left-hand side contain results for data on all services exports (corresponding to ebops category 200), and the ones on the right-hand side contain results for data on all services exports except for merchanting (corresponding to ebops category 268). All of the regression results pertain to two-way fixed effects models with fixed exporter and importer effects.
- Tables 2 and 3 here -8 In order to guard against biased inference, we bootstrap jointly over the two steps.
The reported values for the pseudo-R 2 suggest that the explanatory power of all models (including the first-stage regression in Table 3 ) is quite high. Moreover, the results suggest that -unless we treat net Table 3 .
That 
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